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This paper analyses the co-evolution of science, technology and innovation policy and 
industrial structure in a small, open, resource-based economy (Norway). The contributions of 
the paper are threefold. First, it develops an evolutionary and historically oriented approach to 
the study of the development of these policies that may have wide applicability. Second, it 
focuses on a particular type of innovation, innovation in resource-based activities, that differs 
in many respects from the more commonly studied case of innovation in “high-tech” 
industries. Third, the paper advances our understanding of the roles played by institutions and 
politics in innovation. Previous work on national systems of innovation has devoted little 
attention to these matters, possibly because much of this work examines “snapshots” of 
various innovation systems at a specific point in time and lacks historical depth.    
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The “national innovation system” (NIS) concept first appeared in work by Christopher 
Freeman (Freeman 1987), Bengt Åke Lundvall (Lundvall 1992) and Richard Nelson (Nelson 
1993), and this analytic framework has since been extensively discussed in both scholarly and 
policy-analytic work (Sharif 2006). Yet despite the popularity of the concept, scholars 
disagree on how best to apply the innovation system concept to individual nations (Edquist 
2004).  This paper argues that the development of national innovation systems is best studied 
as a historical process.
1 The emergence and evolution of an innovation system rests on a co-
evolutionary process, in which the development of firms and industries, on the one hand, 
interacts with and affects a national public research infrastructure, policies and institutions, on 
the other. Such co-evolutionary processes may also give rise to path dependencies of various 
sorts, e.g., processes that systematically favor some types of activities (or solutions or ideas) 
while constraining others (Arthur 1994, Narula 2002). Path dependencies extend beyond 
economic structures and interactions to include institutions and policies (North 1990, Pierson 
2000).  
 
The national innovation systems concept has been used in both a narrow and a broader sense 
(Edquist 2004). The narrower definition of the national innovation system includes innovative 
firms and the public research infrastructure with which they interact in varying degrees 
(Nelson 1993). The broader definition extends to include all learning and innovation activities 
in a country regardless of where these take place (Lundvall 1992, 2003, Edquist 2004). This 
paper uses a broad definition of the concept.
2 Thus we consider more than the organizations 
(e.g., universities and research institutes) that develop and transmit knowledge, or 
organizational units within firms, such as R&D departments, that seek to develop and exploit 
knowledge.  
 
This broader perspective is essential for several reasons. First, innovation and knowledge 
yield economic benefits less from their creation than from their application to the production 
of new and existing goods and services. An exclusive focus on the creation of new 
technologies that ignores their exploitation risks overlooking essential cross-national 
differences in the translation of new knowledge into economic gains. The effective 
exploitation of new knowledge or technology is especially important for small countries such 
as Norway, whose contribution to the global pool of knowledge necessarily is dwarfed by the 
potential contributions from effective exploitation of this pool for Norway’s economic 
growth. Second, in Norway as well as elsewhere, considerable learning and innovation occur 
outside of the boundaries of organizations created specifically to support innovation (Lundvall 
1992, 2003, 2007). Ignoring the contributions to economic prosperity from these “non-
formal” innovation-related activities may yield a biased account of the sources of economic 
growth that in turn yields misleading policy guidance.  Third, since sectors and industries 
differ in the ways in which learning and innovation occur within their boundaries (Pavitt 
1984, Malerba 2004), the use of a broad perspective for understanding innovation is 
especially important in examining a nation such as Norway, since its pattern of economic 
specialization differs significantly from that of most other high-income economies. 
 
This paper employs historical and evolutionary perspectives to analyze the development of 
the Norwegian innovation system. In the next section we outline the paper’s theoretical 
perspective in more detail and relate it to other literature on the subject. Section 3 presents an 
analysis of the contemporary Norwegian innovation system and compares it with other 
countries on a similar level of economic development. This analysis highlights some  
 
3 
important differences between the Norwegian innovation system and those of its Nordic 
neighbors, Finland and Sweden. One unusual feature of the Norwegian innovation system that 
has been characterized as “paradoxical” (OECD 2007, Grønning et al 2008) is the fact that 
Norway combines high growth in productivity and income with comparatively low levels of 
investment in R&D.  Although paradoxical by comparison with other industrial economies, 
these features of Norway’s economy and innovation system reflect the historical development 
of the Norwegian economy, as we point out in Section 4. The final section summarizes the 
lessons of our study. 
2.  Innovation, path dependency and policy: Theoretical perspectives 
 
Evolutionary approaches to the analysis of innovation emphasize variety creation, adaptation, 
selection and retention, all of which are time- and path-dependent. At any point in time many 
new ideas emerge, but only those that are well adapted to the contemporary selection 
environment are likely to be applied and form the basis for continuing adaptation and 
improvement.  This selection process is associated with a Schumpeterian process of 
technological competition (Fagerberg 2003), characterized by entry (and exit) of firms, 
continuous innovation, gradual development of standards, the adaptation or creation of 
institutions, etc. Nevertheless, there are important differences among industries or 
technological fields in the operation of these processes (Pavitt 1984, Carlsson and 
Stankiewicz 1991, Malerba 2004). For example, in pharmaceuticals or biotechnology, 
codified knowledge, university research and formal instruments for protection of intellectual 
property (e.g., patents) are very important, while in some other fields, such as the auto 
industry, ship-building and construction, these factors are less important than in-house 
learning, interaction with customers and suppliers, or secrecy (Malerba 2004, von 
Tunzelmann and Acha 2004). 
 
A national system of innovation consists of firms in many different sectors operating within a 
common (national) “knowledge infrastructure” and a common institutional and political 
framework.  The sectoral composition of a given national economy therefore influences the 
operation and structure of its national innovation system, even as the national innovation 
system affects the performance of its constituent sectoral systems. Hence, the relationship 
between sectoral and national innovation systems is a coevolutionary one, in which sectoral 
characteristics (and the needs of firms in these sectors) influence the development of the 
knowledge infrastructure, institutions and policies at the national level, while these factors 
influence the subsequent evolution of the national economy, including its sectoral 
composition.  
 
The importance and extent of path dependency within innovation processes have given rise to 
a large literature (Arthur 1989, 1994, David 1986, North 1990, Grabher 1993, Liebowitz and 
Margolis 1994, 1995, Pierson 2000, Niosi 2002, Martin and Sunley 2006). Within economics, 
much of this literature has focused on mechanisms that may lead to economies of scale, such 
as the adoption of standards. However, institutions and politics may also be relevant in this 
context (Pierson 2000, Whitley 2002). Institutions or “rules of the game” (North 1990) are 
difficult and costly to establish but facilitate economic interactions enormously once adopted, 
leading to scale advantages.  Thus, institutions and, arguably, politics (Rose 1990) may be 
important sources of path dependency in their own right (North 1990).   
 
The national innovation system also is the selection environment for new entrepreneurial 
ventures, and path-dependency influences these selection processes. New ventures that have  
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little in common with economically strong existing sectors may find that the national 
innovation system is poorly adapted to their needs. Narula (2002), for example, argued that 
the development of Norway’s innovation system has produced a structure of policies and 
institutions that provide little support for new, knowledge-intensive sectors.   
 
Although path dependency has been important in the evolution of the Norwegian and other 
national innovation systems, the development of these systems is affected by more than past 
developments alone. Innovation systems are open systems; new initiatives do appear within 
them, and the selection processes that winnow out these initiatives are complex and operate at 
multiple levels
3. It is unrealistic to portray the knowledge infrastructure, entrepreneurs, and 
political coalitions within even a relatively small nation such as Norway as monolithic. For 
example, as we will show below, Norwegian entrepreneurs with contrasting interests and 
economic visions exploited different political groups with conflicting perceptions of the 




Norway was once one of the poorer countries in Europe. According to Maddison (2003), in 
1870 Norway’s GDP per capita was only three quarters of the Western European average. By 
1973, however, Norway had caught up with the most Western European countries, and by 
2001, Norway’s GDP per capita was one quarter higher than the Western European average. 
Hence by the beginning of the 21st century, Norway had become one of the richest countries 
in the world.  
 
How can such a remarkable episode of economic growth be explained?  The explanation of 
international differences in economic performance has been a central theme for economists 
since Adam Smith first raised the question in his study of The Wealth of Nations (1776).  
Until recently, however, most economists’ thinking about the subject focused on such factors 
as natural-resource endowments, labor supply and capital accumulation. More recent research, 
however, has shifted its focus towards intangibles such as knowledge or innovation. 
4 
 
Innovation is often associated with high-technology industries, such as information and 
communication technologies, scientific research in large-scale facilities in firms or 
universities, and professionals working in urban environments. Norway, however, has no 
major international firms in high-tech industries, and no university that ranks among the top 
50 worldwide. Moreover, Norway’s population is small (currently 4.6 million) and the 
country is among the 50 countries with the lowest population density in the world (about 12 
people per km
2).  Its capital and largest city, Oslo, has just over half a million inhabitants. 
These characteristics are rarely associated with strong national innovative performance, 
especially in knowledge-intensive industries. 
 
(FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE) 
 
Figure 1 compares Norwegian GDP per capita (measured in purchasing power parity terms) 
with regional GDP per capita in Western Europe.
5  The blue line shows the Norwegian level, 
and the thick black line indicates the Western European average. As we noted earlier, postwar 
Norwegian GDP per capita was roughly equal to the Western European average until the first 
oil crisis of the 1970s, which led to recession and lower growth elsewhere in Europe.  Norway 
was less seriously affected by the recession, and experienced more rapid growth than the other  
 
5 
countries in Western Europe after the mid-1970s.  This Norwegian “growth spurt” is related 
to the discovery of Norway’s offshore oil and gas fields that began production in the early 
1970s (the two dotted lines in Figure 1 depict Norwegian oil and gas production). Although 
oil and gas production remained low in the first half of the 1970s, output subsequently grew 
rapidly, and this sector’s importance within the Norwegian economy increased dramatically 
during from 1975 onwards.   
 
Norway was not the only northwest European nation to discover and exploit offshore oil and 
gas deposits during the 1960s and 1970s—the United Kingdom, Denmark, and the 
Netherlands all benefited from similar discoveries.  Nonetheless, the transformative effects of 
oil and gas appear to have been most significant in the Norwegian economy.  Although 
Norway’s oil and gas sector accounts for a small share of national employment, the sector’s 
development opened up a huge market that Norwegian manufacturing and services firms 
successfully exploited, partly as a result of public policy. Firms in sectors such as 
shipbuilding, engineering, ICT and other business services expanded their sales in this rapidly 
expanding market, aided by supportive governmental policies (see Engen 2009). In the 
Netherlands, another small open economy, oil and gas production was associated with de-
industrialization, the so-called “Dutch disease,” resulting from the appreciation of its currency 
a loss in competitiveness within domestic manufacturing.  In Norway, however, the growth of 
the oil and gas sector benefited domestic manufacturing industry, output from which arguably 
grew more rapidly than otherwise might have been the case (Cappelen et al. 2000).   
 
The rapidly increasing income from the oil and gas sector also enabled Norway’s government 
to pursue a more expansionary fiscal and monetary policy than those of other Western 
European governments during the 1980s and 1990s. As a consequence of these developments, 
Norwegian rates of labor force participation and economic growth were consistently higher - 
and unemployment markedly lower - than in Western Europe as a whole.  Norwegian GDP 
per capita now is approximately one quarter higher than the West European average (Figure 
1).  About one half of this difference can be explained as rents from oil and gas production 
(reflecting returns to investment in physical capital above what is “normal” in the economy as 
a whole).
6 It should be emphasized, however, that by allowing high growth in demand, high 
labor force participation and rapid (and economically beneficial) structural changes, the oil 
and gas sector also had important indirect effects on the economy. What Norwegian GDP per 
capita would have been in the absence of oil and gas exploration is a difficult question that we 
cannot pursue in the necessary detail here.
7 But it seems likely that Norway’s economic 
development without oil and gas would not differ dramatically from that of its neighbors 
Denmark and Sweden. 
  
Although oil and gas now is Norway’s most economically important resource-related 
industry, Norwegian economic development historically has relied on the exploitation of a 
rich natural resource endowment. Most of these resources were related to the geography of the 
country, such the sea (fishing, shipping and related industries), and other opportunities created 
by Norway’s mountainous terrain for mining and production of hydroelectric power, which 
provided the basis for the nation’s electrometallurgical and electrochemical industries.  
Although these sectors now account for a smaller share of Norwegian GDP than in previous 
periods, they are important sources of income and employment in some regions of Norway 
and retain considerable influence in Norwegian domestic politics. They also contribute 




Figure 2 illustrates the Norwegian pattern of specialization in production of tradable goods 
and services in 2002, relative to the European average. The index has a zero mean and varies 
between unity (indicating products that are produced only in Norway) and minus one (not 
produced in Norway).
8  It shows that in addition to its large oil and gas sector, Norway 
remains highly specialized in fisheries, shipping and related industries.  During the second 
half of the 20th century, Norway pioneered the development of fish-farming, and the nation 
remains among the global leaders in this industry.  As we noted earlier, the shipbuilding 
industry has retained its economic significance within Norway by diversifying into production 
of equipment for exploration and production of oil and gas. The basic metals sector, a large 
user of hydroelectric power, is another natural resource-based sector in which Norway 
remains specialized.  
 
(FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE) 
 
The relationship between Norway’s pattern of economic specialization and its innovation 
system is a central theme of this paper and the topic of long-running policy debates in 
Norway. As was noted above, one view of the role of technology in economic growth holds 
that a strong high-technology industrial base (consisting of ICT, biotech, new materials, 
pharmaceuticals, and selected other industries) is necessary for prosperity.  As we argue in the 
following section, however, Norway’s resource-based sectors (aluminium, oil and gas and 
fish-farming) have for decades been highly innovative, drawing on domestic sources of 
innovation, technology transfer from foreign sources (the success of which relied on 
substantial indigenous Norwegian “absorptive capacity”) and Norway’s universities and 
research institutes.  
 
One manifestation of the strong performance of Norway’s economy during the past 30 years 
is its high rate of labor productivity growth, which has averaged more than 2.5% per year 
since 1975 (OECD, 2007).  This strong economic performance, however, is associated with 
much lower levels of R&D investment than in most other high-income European economies.
9 
Figure 3 compares R&D spending as a share of GDP in Norway with that of other high-
income industrial economies, and shows that Norway’s R&D/GDP ratio of 1.6% is in the 
lower half of the reference group. Moreover, like most other countries with low R&D 
intensity, Norway’s economy is characterized by a relatively large share of government-
financed R&D, which consists mainly of R&D carried out in universities and institutes within 
the public sector.    
 
(FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE) 
 
Although R&D spending is widely used in cross-national comparisons, it is only one of 
several important factors contributing to strong national innovative performance. In fact, the 
importance of R&D investment relative to other factors varies substantially among economic 
sectors (Fagerberg et al. 2004).  Does the unusual Norwegian pattern of specialization by 
comparison with other European economies explain its lower levels of R&D investment? For 
instance, it is possible that the sectoral innovation systems in Norway’s fields of 
specialization operate differently, or rely on sources of innovation that require lower levels of 
R&D investment, than in other European economies.  We examine this question by 
controlling for cross-national differences in economic specialization patterns when comparing 




For example, the ICT industry is very R&D-intensive, and accounts for a large share of 
Swedish GDP. Norway's ICT industry, however, is small. This structural difference between 
the two economies contributes to the higher GDP share of R&D performed in industry in 
Sweden relative to Norway. By using a common set of sectoral weights when comparing 
Norway and Sweden, we are able to control for the effects of such structural differences.
10 
Figure 4 compares the share of value added accounted for by Norwegian business R&D 
(R&D performed within industry) with similar figures for other Western European countries 
as reported by the OECD (“actual”) and weighted by the industrial structure of the country 
with which Norway is compared (“adjusted”). If Norwegian firms on average do more R&D 
than firms in the same sectors in the other country, the “adjusted” ratio will be above one and 
vice versa.  
 
(FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE) 
 
The results reported in Figure 4 indicate that Norway’s economic structure affects its low 
R&D/GDP ratio.  In five out of the six comparisons (the exception being Sweden, a nation 
with one of the highest R&D/GDP ratios in the world), Norwegian firms perform as much 
business-enterprise R&D as do foreign firms in the same sectors.  The finding that the low 
level of Norwegian R&D is influenced by the nation’s pattern of economic specialization is 
corroborated by the results of other studies (OECD 2007).  Nonetheless, as we pointed out 
earlier, R&D is only one factor in innovation, and R&D investment data may not capture 
other important aspects of sectoral or national innovation-related activity. One source of data 
that covers a broader set of innovation-related activities is the Community Innovation Survey 
(CIS), carried out throughout Europe. Innovation in this survey is a broad concept that 
includes the introduction of production and processes that are new to the firm, not necessarily 
new to the market (Bloch 2007).    
 
Figure 5 compares the share of innovative firms in Norway with that of other European 
countries (as reported by the CIS4, the fourth version of the survey, undertaken in 2004). The 
measure “share of innovative firms” is the number of firms that report having undertaken 
successful product or process innovation divided by the total number of reporting firms for 
the country in question. As in the previous figure, the Norwegian share is compared with 
those for other economies on an “actual” and “adjusted” basis, the latter comparison being 
adjusted for cross-national differences in industrial structure. Thus, if Norwegian firms are 
more innovative than firms in the other country, the share will be above one or vice versa. The 
comparative data in Figure 5 suggest that the share of innovative firms in Norway is 
comparable to that of several Southern European countries but lower than that of other high-
income countries in Northern Europe with which it may more usefully be compared 
(particularly Sweden and Germany).  Interestingly, and in contrast to R&D (Figure 4), the 
result does not appear to be sensitive to cross-national differences in specialization patterns.
11  
  
(FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE) 
 
The Community Innovation Survey also contains important information about qualitative 
features of the Norwegian innovation system. As emphasized in the innovation literature 
(Lundvall 1992, van de Ven 1999) innovation is an interactive phenomenon, and success 
depends on the ability of firms to cooperate with others and with customers (Lundvall 1988, 
von Hippel 1988). The central importance of the latter follows from the simple insight that 
innovations that do not address customer needs often fail. Moreover, there is a good deal of 
customer-based learning that may benefit innovating firms. Figure 6 reports the share of firms  
 
8 
that cooperate with others in innovation (based on data from the Community Innovation 
Survey). Norway, together with the other Nordic countries, scores especially high on this 
dimension.  Norway also ranks high on the reported importance of producer-customer 
interactions in innovation (Figure 7).  
 
(FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE) 
 
(FIGURE 7 ABOUT HERE) 
  
Innovation is not only – or mainly – about inventing new things, but depends as well on 
commercial exploitation of the opportunities created by new knowledge in established as well 
as new industries and products (Schumpeter 1934, Kline and Rosenberg 1986, Fagerberg 
2004). One measure of a country’s ability to identify, absorb and exploit new knowledge, 
often termed “absorptive capacity” (Cohen and Levinthal 1990), is the level of education 
among its population, particularly levels of higher education (Figure 8).   Norway and other 
Nordic countries have substantially higher shares of tertiary-education degreeholders than is 
true of many other European economies. Another indicator of absorptive capacity is the level 
of adoption of important new technologies within an economy. Figure 9 compares the level of 
Norwegian adoption in 2005 of one such “general purpose technology,” personal computers, 
with that of other European nations, revealing that the Nordic countries, including Norway, 
display the highest rates of adoption for PCs.  These indicators point to an important strength 
of the Norwegian innovation system, its strong performance in knowledge diffusion and 
cooperation in innovation.
12  This characteristic of national innovation systems is typically not 
captured by conventional indicators of innovation inputs or outputs. 
   
(FIGURE 8 ABOUT HERE) 
 
(FIGURE 9 ABOUT HERE) 
 
The Norwegian economy has generated strong growth in productivity, employment and 
income since 1970. At the same time, however, Norway invests an unusually low share of 
GDP in R&D, particularly within the business sector, and the CIS data also suggest that the 
level of industrial innovation in Norway is not particularly impressive, at least by comparison 
with other high-income economies in Northern Europe.  Other characteristics of industrial 
innovation in Norway, however, such as the level of collaboration in innovation, producer-
customer interaction, the qualifications of the labor force and the limited indicators on 
technology adoption, are relatively strong by comparison with most other European 
economies. These apparently contradictory indicators and findings underscore the need for a 





Norway’s economic development has been characterized by the emergence over time of 
sectors with different approaches to innovation (Wicken 2009a, 2009b).  The “small-scale 
decentralized” development path, which dominated Norway until the early twentieth century 
and remains economically and politically important, is characterized by small firms that invest 
little of their own funds in innovation-related activities. Beginning in the late 19
th century, 
however, a sector characterized by large-scale, centralized enterprises, often financed by  
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foreigners, expanded within Norway, based on the exploitation of opportunities in capital-  
and energy- intensive industries such as in metals, electrochemistry, and hydroelectric power.  
But as we note below, even the firms within these industries were slow to develop in-house 
R&D.  After the Second World War, an influential group of policymakers, technocrats and 
academics – the “modernizers” (see Textbox 1) - promoted the growth of a “knowledge-
intensive, network-based” development path characterized by R&D-intensive firms in “new” 
industrial sectors such as ICT, relying on public investments in Norway’s national R&D 
infrastructure of public laboratories and universities. In Norway, as in other high-income 
economies, these three development paths and corresponding sectoral innovation systems 
have coexisted, rather than one being succeeded historically by another.  Norway thus is home 
to a diverse and complex “ecology” of innovation systems, illustrated by the contrasting 
examples of fish-farming, aluminium, and information technology, all three of which have 
played important roles in Norway through much of the 20th century.   
 
At the beginning of the 20th century, the Norwegian economy relied extensively on external 
sources for new technologies. Technologies from foreign sources were adapted to Norwegian 
conditions by technically trained individuals, many of whom had been educated abroad. A 
national public research infrastructure evolved slowly in response to the needs of Norwegian 
firms and industries (Gulbrandsen and Nerdrum 2009a), and initially gave priority to 
supporting established (and politically influential) industries, such as mining, fisheries and 
agriculture. A mining college was founded under Danish rule during the 18th century, and by 
the turn of the 20th century, Norway’s primary industries lobbied successfully for the 
formation of public research institutes in agriculture and fisheries. Only with the emergence 
of the large-scale, capital-intensive industries of the early twentieth century was Norway’s 
technical university (NTNU) established (1910), nearly a century after the foundation of 
Sweden’s technical university. Once established, NTNU became an important source of 
qualified personnel for industry, particularly Norway’s scale-intensive, resource-based 
enterprises. Norwegian university scientists and engineers became active in industrial 
consultancy in the first half of the 20th century, and during the following decades Norway’s  
research institutes, many of which are public (or semi-public), expanded their operations.  
Foreign sources of technology and capital also continued to play an important role in many of 
Norway’s large-scale, resource-intensive industries 
 
By the mid-twentieth century, Norway’s national innovation system had acquired many of its 
current features. Norwegian firms were innovative in many respects and demanded highly 
educated labor. But they invested little in internal R&D. Instead they utilized “localized 
search” (Nelson and Winter 1982) in problem-solving, seeking technical knowledge from 
other firms, research institutes, public sources, academia etc.  Only when the search for 
solutions from external sources was unsuccessful did Norwegian firms invest substantially in 
intrafirm R&D. In-house R&D became more significant as some Norwegian firms 
approached the international knowledge frontier during the 1960s and 1970s.  Nevertheless, 
through much of the 20
th century, the dominant approach to innovation within much of 
Norwegian industry relied on interaction with other actors in the system, in combination with 
modest levels of investment in intrafirm R&D (Wicken 2009a, 2009b, Gulbrandsen and 
Nerdrum 2009a). 
  
Even today the strong tendency for Norwegian firms to engage with other partners in 
innovation, e.g., to pursue collaborative innovation strategies, distinguishes Norway’s 
innovation system from that of many other developed economies, as we noted earlier. In 
particular, as Lepori et al (2007) point out, the propensity of Norwegian firms to cooperate  
 
10 
with public research institutes is high by international standards. 30-40% of the firms in 
several important Norwegian manufacturing industries report that they collaborate with public 
research institutes (Gulbrandsen and Nerdrum 2009b), and user surveys indicate that the firms 
value such cooperation highly. These surveys also reveal that prior experience with such 
cooperation heavily affects both Norwegian firms’ willingness to cooperate with public 
institutions and the value that they assign to such collaboration, illustrating the path-
dependent character of these relationships (Nerdrum and Gulbrandsen 2009).  
 
The historically low level of investment by Norwegian firms in intrafirm R&D did not 
preclude technological innovation. The extensive structural changes that have occurred in the 
Norwegian economy during the last century have been accompanied by a stream of 
economically important innovations. For example, the rise of the large scale, capital-intensive 
path of economic development in the early 20th century was based on the exploration of 
hydroelectric energy by Norwegian entrepreneurs such as Sam Eyde, who in a classically 
Schumpeterian fashion, developed a “new combination” of knowledge, capabilities and 
resources (Wicken 2009a, Gulbrandsen and Nerdrum 2009a). The Norwegian oil and gas 
industry faced daunting challenges in producing oil and gas under conditions of 
unprecedented complexity and hazardousness, and developed new technological and 
organizational solutions (e.g., the CONDEEP platforms; see Engen 2009). The Norwegian 
fish-farming industry also relied on a stream of important innovations in fish farming, 
processing, and disease control. But none of these major innovations, which relied on well-
developed engineering competences and highly competent labor, depended on large-scale 
intrafirm R&D programs. Indeed, many such innovations, which affected the entire 
production system of Norway’s natural-resource industries, may not even be classified as 
innovations by CIS-type surveys that mainly focus on technological (product and process) 
innovations (Smith 2004).  
 
The previous section emphasized the contributions of institutions and politics to the path-
dependent development of innovation systems, and the evolution of the Norwegian national 
innovation system clearly reflects the influence of political as well as institutional 
developments. For example, the continued existence and extensive government support for 
the “small-scale, decentralized” path of industrial development in Norway was the outcome of 
intense political struggles during the interwar period (Wicken 2009a). The resulting political 
commitments and institutions shaped the organization of the Norwegian fish-farming industry 
half a century later and continues to influence the development of that industry in modern 
Norway. These policies, along with other characteristics of Norwegian fish-farming, have 
produced a structure that contrasts with some of those other countries, particularly Scotland, 
that entered the industry later. While in Scotland fish-farming is dominated by large firms, the 
Norwegian industry has a much more heterogeneous structure, in which a small number of 
large, increasingly global firms coexist with a large group of small, family owned firms 
(Aslesen 2009). 
 
Another example of institutional persistence that had far-reaching consequences for 
Norwegian economic and technological development is the “concession laws” that were 
adopted in the early decades of the 20th century. These laws were originally drafted to create 
a framework for national control of natural resources, specifically, hydroelectric power, and 
influenced the early years of Norway’s aluminium industry (Moen 2009).  But as Engen 
(2009) notes, this regulatory heritage also influenced the development of Norway’s offshore 
oil and gas sector more than half a century later. The technological and organizational 
development of the Norwegian oil and gas industry might well have followed a very different  
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path that more closely resembled that in the offshore oil and gas industries in Denmark and 
the United Kingdom in the absence of the regulatory system created during the early 20th 
century for an entirely different sector.  
 
Institutions and politics thus have exerted great influence on the development of Norway’s 
national innovation system, and the Norwegian case is by no means a unique one.   Previous 
work on national systems of innovation has devoted little attention to the historic co-evolution 
of industries, institutions, and politics, possibly because much of it examines “snapshots” of 
various innovation systems at a specific point in time.  One of the advantages of this 
historical, evolutionary perspective is that it advances our understanding of the roles played 





Norway’s dependence on natural resources has always been controversial within domestic 
politics.  During the post-1945 period, a strong and politically powerful lobby of 
“modernizers” gained political power and argued that a modernization of the industrial 
structure of the country in the direction of “high-tech” industry, particularly ICT, was a must. 
The “modernizers” were strongly influenced by the achievements of US and British scientists, 
military research facilities and “high-tech” firms during and after the Second World War and 
wanted to create a similar dynamic in Norway by supporting military R&D, public research 
labs (particularly within ICT) and selected “high-tech” firms. The national industrial research 
council (NTNF) and national defense research establishment (FFI), both established in 1946, 
were central institutional actors in the “modernizing” network, along with other public and 
semi-public laboratories (Wicken 2009b, Gulbrandsen and Nerdrum 2009a). 
 
The modernizers’ economic and political agenda was widely accepted among policymakers, 
and for several decades public R&D labs and selected high-tech firms, particularly within 
ICT, received substantial financial and political support from government (Wicken 2009b). 
These policies produced several important inventions in military technology, computer 
software (e.g., the SIMULA language; see Sogner 2009), computer hardware and 
telecommunications, including the GSM system for mobile telephony (Sogner 2009). For a 
time, these investments generated substantial civilian spinoffs in the form of thriving “high-
tech” firms in the computer and telecommunication industries. However, the displacement 
within the global IT industry of dominant technologies such as minicomputers, the shift 
towards a more economically liberal political stance among Norwegian policymakers, 
deregulation efforts and the intensified global competition in ICT that characterized the 1980s 
all undermined Norway’s “high-tech” industrial strategy. Many of the firms supported by 
these programs went out of business and today production of ICT products for the mass 
market has ceased in Norway (Sogner 2009). 
 
The attempt to make Norway a “high-tech” leader thus ended in failure. The competences 
created by these policies in ICT technology, however, produced payoffs in other parts of the 
economy, particularly in the rapidly expanding oil and gas industry (Engen 2009, Sogner 
2009). Hence, instead of substituting for resource-based industries, as the “modernizers” 
envisaged, their efforts instead strengthened innovation and competitiveness within the 





Norway’s economic performance has been characterized as a “paradox”    (OECD 2007, 
Grønning et al 2008). Productivity and income are among the highest in the world, even when 
the rents from the oil and gas sector are excluded from the calculations. But Norwegian R&D 
investment accounts for a small share of GDP by comparison with other industrial economies, 
and other measures of Norwegian innovation activity, although imprecise, also are not very 
impressive.  How can this be explained? 
  
Three interrelated aspects of Norwegian economic development are important in explaining 
this paradox.  They are subsumed under the headings innovation, path-dependency and policy.  
First, the broad perspective on innovation and long-run economic change employed in this 
paper highlights the important role that innovation has played in Norway’s economic 
performance, although the characteristics of Norway’s industrial base and the processes of 
innovation that it supports mean that much of this innovation has eluded straightforward 
measurement. Perhaps the most important factor in Norway’s innovative performance has 
been the ability of Norwegian entrepreneurs, firms, and public sector actors to recognize 
opportunities, mobilize resources, adapt existing capabilities and develop new ones, and 
develop appropriate institutions and policies. The system’s adaptability thus appears to be one 
of the important factors contributing to Norway’s successful technological and economic 
development. This adaptability arguably reflects other social, cultural, institutional and/or 
political characteristics of Norway and other nations that we cannot pursue here but present 
promising lines for future research.
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Second, the historical development of Norway’s national innovation system is characterized 
by strong path dependency. The Norwegian innovation system has been dominated by 
resource-based innovation. The development of new industries that are less closely linked to 
natural resources, in spite of considerable support from public policy, has been relatively 
unsuccessful in Norway. The failure of the “modernizing” policies in Norway is less a result 
of active resistance from established firms in politically powerful sectors than a reflection of 
the continued vitality of innovation-led growth and productivity in those sectors (Castellacci 
et al 2009). Norway’s resource-based sectors have displayed considerable dynamism in 
developing knowledge and adapting to new challenges.  
 
Third, as we pointed out above, institutions and politics have fundamentally influenced the 
development of Norway’s industrial structure and its innovation-related activities. Arguably, 
path dependency is as much a political and institutional phenomenon as an economic one in 
Norway’s national innovation system. The political and institutional factors that have been 
important in the Norwegian case nevertheless extend far beyond a narrow definition of 
science, technology and innovation policy, underscoring the need to employ a broad 
perspective in the study of innovation systems. 
  
However successful Norway’s economy appears to be today, its history of innovation and 
economic growth does not constitute a basis for complacency about the future, which poses 
significant challenges. Although the oil and gas sector will remain economically important, 
there can be no doubt that the period of rapid economic growth based on the exploitation of 
Norway’s offshore oil and gas is approaching its end, and future growth will have to rely on 
other sources (OECD 2008). A second important change is the end of the century-long era of 
cheap hydroelectric energy, the abundant supply of which led to the establishment of  
 
14 
electrometallurgical and electrochemical industries in Norway. The future competitiveness of 
these Norwegian industries will depend on technological and organizational innovations that 
offset the advantages flowing to foreign firms with lower energy costs. Thus, although natural 
resources may play an important role in Norway’s future economic growth, maintaining the 
nation’s strong performance will require an increase in the level and scope of innovative 
activity. Arguably, this need for expanded innovation holds not only for the areas of 
traditional strength but for the economy as a whole.
 14  Hence, raising the share of Norway’s 
overall firm population that is active in innovation, rather than focusing primarily on firms in 
“high tech” sectors, is a natural target for innovation policy.
15 
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Figure 2. The five leading areas of Norwegian specialization, based on production of 
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Figure 4.  Norway’s share of business R&D in GDP relative to those of other countries, 






Source: Eurostat (CIS 4)  
Figure 5.  Innovative firms as a share of all Norwegian firms relative to other European 





   
Figure  6.    Share  of  innovative  firms  with  cooperation  arrangements  on  innovation 






Figure 7.  Share of innovative firms that rank customers as “highly important” sources 










Figure 8.   Percentage of Population with tertiary education (age 25-64), Norway and a 







Figure 9.   Penetration of PCs within the population, Norway and a reference group, 
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